When Christmas Delivery Becomes Geopolitics: What La Poste Tells Us About Hybrid Warfare
Why it matters: A pro-Russian hacking group shut down France’s national postal service three days before Christmas, disrupting package tracking, online banking, and digital identity systems for millions. The attack exemplifies how hybrid warfare now targets everyday infrastructure to maximise psychological disruption—and why European boards must treat geopolitical risk as an operational concern, not an abstract strategic consideration.
What happened
On Monday 22 December 2025, France’s national postal service La Poste suffered a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack that crippled nine interconnected digital services. The assault began at approximately 6:15 AM local time, targeting the organisation’s DNS infrastructure—the system that translates website addresses into the numerical codes computers use to connect. [1][2]
Think of it like someone blocking every entrance to a shopping centre simultaneously. The building still exists, the shops inside are intact, but nobody can get through the doors.
The technical scope was extensive. Services knocked offline included the main laposte.fr website, mobile applications, Colissimo parcel tracking, La Banque Postale online banking, Digiposte secure document storage, La Poste Mobile telecommunications, and the organisation’s Digital Identity authentication service. [2][3]
La Poste confirmed that customer data remained secure throughout—DDoS attacks overwhelm systems with fake traffic rather than infiltrating databases. The objective was disruption, not theft. [1]
By Christmas Eve, some services had partially recovered. Online banking resumed normal operations and call centres were functional, but full restoration remained incomplete and parcel tracking continued experiencing problems. [4]
The timing was deliberate. La Poste is one of Europe’s largest postal operators, handling 2.6 billion packages annually. The organisation had forecast processing 180 million parcels across November and December 2025—a 6% increase on the previous year. Attacking during the final pre-Christmas delivery window maximised both operational disruption and public frustration. [24][25]
Who was responsible
French prosecutors confirmed on 24 December that the pro-Russian hacktivist group NoName057(16) had claimed responsibility for the attack. France’s domestic intelligence agency (DGSI) subsequently assumed control of the investigation, elevating the case from routine cybercrime to a national security matter. [5][8]
NoName057(16) emerged in March 2022, shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and has become the most prolific pro-Russian DDoS group in operation. The collective has claimed responsibility for nearly 4,500 attacks between August 2024 and mid-July 2025, with particular focus on NATO members and Ukraine-aligned countries. [9][10]
The group recruits volunteers through Telegram, providing civilians with specialised software called “DDoSia” that allows them to contribute their own computing power to coordinated attacks. Over 4,000 volunteers have joined since the war began, supplementing a botnet of several hundred compromised servers. [12][13]
Previous targets have included government websites in Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Germany; banking systems across Scandinavia; and sites related to NATO summits. French infrastructure has been targeted before, the La Poste attack fits an established pattern. [14][12]
Attribution confidence: High for NoName057(16) involvement, based on the group’s direct claim, consistent operational signature, and verification by French prosecutors. However, attributing the attack to the Russian state requires qualification.
European law enforcement indicates the group maintains “central command and control structures in the Russian Federation” that supply targeting to volunteers. [17] Cybersecurity researchers note collaboration with known Russian intelligence fronts including Killnet (linked to the GRU’s Unit 74455) and XakNet (confirmed state-sponsored). [18]
Ukrainian intelligence officials go further, assessing that “true hacktivism in Russia does not exist” and that intelligence services pressure independent cybercriminals into state service through arrest threats and financial incentives. [19]
Yet France has not formally attributed the attack to Moscow. Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez stated that “foreign interference very often comes from the same country”—strongly implying Russian involvement whilst stopping short of official attribution. [21][22] This careful formulation reflects both genuine ambiguity around proxy operations and diplomatic considerations about escalation.
What this means for European organisations
The La Poste incident illustrates three shifts that boards and security leaders must incorporate into strategic planning.
First, critical infrastructure now includes services previously considered mundane. Postal services, while essential, rarely feature in discussions of national security. Yet La Poste handles digital identity authentication, banking for 10.8 million customers, and logistics infrastructure that businesses depend upon. When these systems fail simultaneously during peak demand, the cascading effects touch millions of people and thousands of organisations. [1][3]
Second, hybrid warfare operates on psychological timelines, not technical ones. The attack caused no data breach and no permanent damage. Its purpose was disruption during a moment of maximum emotional significance—Christmas—when public frustration would be highest and media coverage most intense. This represents a shift from cyber operations seeking strategic military advantage to operations designed to erode public confidence and create chronic uncertainty. [29]
Third, law enforcement disruption provides temporary relief, not permanent protection. In July 2025, Operation Eastwood—a coordinated effort by agencies from 12 countries—dismantled over 100 NoName057(16) servers and issued seven arrest warrants. The group resumed operations within days. [10][11] Organisations cannot rely on law enforcement to neutralise threats; they must assume persistent hostile activity.
European intelligence services now assess that hybrid threat investigations consume resources equivalent to terrorism cases. Denmark’s military intelligence rates Russian sabotage risk as “high,” while Germany’s intelligence service identifies the Bundeswehr as a priority target. All forecasts project escalation through 2026. [30][7]
Risks and constraints
Overattribution risks: Not every cyberattack on European infrastructure is Russian state-directed. Treating all incidents as geopolitical may cause organisations to overlook domestic threats, criminal operations, or simple technical failures. The La Poste attack has verified attribution to NoName057(16), but the group’s relationship to Russian intelligence remains contested among experts. [18][19]
Deterrence limitations: Formal state attribution typically precedes diplomatic consequences; sanctions, expulsions, or proportional responses. France’s decision not to formally attribute the attack to Russia limits response options whilst reflecting the genuine difficulty of proving state direction of proxy groups. Organisations should not expect government action to reduce threat levels. [8]
Resilience trade-offs: La Poste delivered 5.5 million parcels during the attack, including 2 million on Christmas Eve, because physical delivery networks remained operational whilst digital systems failed. [4] This demonstrates that system segregation provides resilience but maintaining parallel physical and digital infrastructure has cost implications that boards must weigh against risk exposure.
Resource asymmetry: NoName057(16) operates with volunteer labour and relatively inexpensive DDoS tools. Defending against persistent, low-cost attacks requires sustained investment that many organisations; particularly public sector bodies and smaller enterprises; struggle to justify against competing priorities.
What to do next
For boards and executive leadership:
Add hybrid warfare scenarios to enterprise risk registers, treating state-aligned cyber disruption as an operational planning factor rather than a theoretical concern
Review critical supplier dependencies for exposure to similar attacks—if your logistics provider, payment processor, or identity verification service experiences prolonged outages, what is your continuity plan?
Ensure cyber resilience metrics appear in board reporting with the same regularity as financial and operational KPIs
For security leaders:
Assess DDoS mitigation capabilities, including contracted services from specialist providers—volumetric attacks of this nature can be substantially mitigated with appropriate preparation
Map dependencies between digital services to understand cascade effects; La Poste’s nine interconnected services failing simultaneously suggests architectural vulnerabilities worth examining in your own environment
Establish communication protocols for extended outages that do not depend on affected systems
For legal and compliance teams:
Review incident response procedures against the possibility of attacks timed to regulatory deadlines, financial reporting periods, or other moments of organisational vulnerability
Understand notification obligations under NIS2 (for organisations in scope) when services are disrupted but data is not compromised
Document the distinction between “attack by group X” and “attack directed by state Y” in incident records—attribution confidence levels matter for regulatory and insurance purposes
For procurement and third-party risk teams:
Incorporate hybrid warfare resilience into vendor assessments for critical services
Request evidence of DDoS mitigation capabilities and business continuity testing from suppliers handling essential functions
Consider geographic and political diversification of critical suppliers to reduce concentration risk
Disclaimer: This article represents analysis based on publicly available information as of December 2025. Attribution assessments reflect the current state of verified reporting and may evolve as investigations progress.
References
[1] Breached.company. “France’s La Poste and La Banque Postale Crippled by Massive Christmas DDoS Attack.” December 2025.
[2] FastNetMon. “DDoS attack disrupts La Poste services just before Christmas.” December 2025.
[3] Sortir à Paris. “Cyberattack at La Poste: Colissimo and Banque Postale services remain disrupted.” December 2025.
[4] La Poste Groupe. “Cyberattack on 22 December: what you need to know.” December 2025.
[5] Yahoo News Singapore. “Pro-Russian hackers claim French postal service cyberattack.” December 2025.
[7] Euronews. “Pro-Russian hackers claim French postal service cyberattack.” December 2025.
[8] Breached.company. “France Opens Intelligence Investigation After Pro-Russian Hackers Claim Responsibility.” December 2025.
[9] Wikipedia. “Noname057(16).”
[10] Security Affairs. “Pro-Russian group Noname057 claims cyberattack on La Poste services.” December 2025.
[11] Telsy. “Operation Eastwood strikes NoName057(16), but does not stop him.” July 2025.
[12] SentinelOne. “NoName057(16) - The Pro-Russian Hacktivist Group Targeting NATO.”
[13] Reuters. “Seven arrest warrants issued in global swoop on suspected Russia-linked hackers.” July 2025.
[14] Kurdistan24. “Pro-Russian Hackers Disrupt French National Postal Service in Pre-Christmas Cyberattack.” December 2025.
[17] CERT-EU. “Cyber Brief 25-08.” July 2025.
[18] The Diplomacy Hub Journal. “Hacktivism In Russian Cyber Strategy.”
[19] Cyberscoop. “Pro-Russian hacktivism isn’t real, top Ukrainian cyber official says.”
[21] Euronews. “French interior ministry targeted in cyberattack, minister confirms.” December 2025.
[22] ABC News. “France probes ‘foreign interference’ after remote control malware found.” December 2025.
[24] Winnipeg CityNews. “Pro-Russian hackers claim cyberattack on French postal service.” December 2025.
[25] La Poste Groupe. “La Poste Groupe gets ready to absorb its parcel activity peak.” November 2025.
[29] CNBC. “Russia is waging ‘hybrid warfare’ against Europe, officials say. What does that mean?” October 2025.
[30] Odessa Journal. “European intelligence agencies: hybrid threats from Russia and China continue to grow.” December 2025.